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This paper consists of my reflections on the object and the
study ofmathematics. Oneofthemain issues that we tried
to deal with in the 'PhiJosophy o{Math' meetingswith pro-
fesso r Alvin WhiteofHarvey Mudd College was the ques-
tion: " WIJQt is the object of mathematics?" This question
raisesmany relevant questions suchas:Wfwlis mathemati-
cal truth? What is thefoundation of mathematics, ifthere
exists one?How doweobtain mathematical knowledge? Is
the method of mathematical proof the only conceivable
method i l l mathematics? Thequestions above areall linked
to one another, and let ue tackle them as a whole.
As Evert W. Beth argues: "According to the current
view, mat hematics is concerned wi th immaterial ob-
jects: poin ts witho ut dimensions, lines with no thick-
ness and so on." '
In other words, this common view argues that math-
ematics is concerned with abst ractions.
"Mathematics abstracts, idealizes, schematizes, con-
structs, simulates.'? According to Putnam, mathemati-
cal truth comes from the fact that mathematics is an
objective science, and as he states:
Mathematics should be interpreted re-
alisti cally -that is, that mathematics
makes asser tions that are objectively
tru e or false, ind ependently of the hu-
man m ind, an d th at something an-
swers to such mathematical notions as
'set' and ' function'. This is not to say
that reality is somehow bifurcated -that
is, th er e is one reali ty of materia l
things, and then, over and above it, a
seco nd reality of ' ma them ati ca l
things' .'
If we accept Putnam's view on mathematical truth,
how can we, human beings, witness and fully con-
ceive the found ations of mathematics? We, human
beings, have access only to the material world. Ifmath-
ematics has a second reality of 'mathematical things'
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which we cannot observe and envision, can we still
believe that ma thematics has its foundations in our
real world?
Putnam argues tha t mathematics d oes not have a cri-
sis in its foundations . He does not believe tha t math-
ematics either has or needs foundations. In our tradi-
tiona l thinking, we ascribe properties such as length ,
width, thickness to material objects, and therefore,
when a human being thinks of a material object, she /
he directly links it with the subjective object, not a real
external object. If such objects .which we call external
objects, exist, we cannot visualize the m, but can con-
ceive their powers . For example, we cannot visualize
a 'set' as we can visualize an 'apple', but we can use
the notion of a 'set' in constructing powerful math-
ematical theories, and conceive the power of thi s con-
struction, although it is not a subjective object.
The first step to obtaining ma thematical tru th is by
obtaining mathematical kno wledge. Because math-
ema tical objects are non-physical realities, the com-
mon view, as Putnam points out, is that the kind of
knowledge we have in mathematics is str ictly a pri ori.
However, Putnam also argues tha t mathematical
knowledge ,in fact, resembles empirical knowledge -
" that is. that the criterion of truth in mathematics just
as mu ch as in physics is success of our ideas in pra c-
tice, and that mathem atical knowledge is corrigible
and not absolute.:" Therefore, what matters in math-
ema tical truth is the power of its non-physical reali-
ties in making a coherent link that is understandable
by the physical world . In thi s sense, mathematica l
knowledge plays an important role in mediating be-
tween the physical world and the non-physical reali-
ties of ma thematical tru th. In other word s, mathemati-
cal knowledge makes mathematical tru th und erstand-
able by the physical world .
Mathematical knowledge starts with precise defini-
tions and auxiliary assump tions . Then, these defin i-
tions are linked together under the assumptions, and
theories are formed . Thomas Hobbes 's definitions of
science.in his book Leviathan, is that science is the
know ledge of consequ ences. In the light of his defini-
tion, mathematical objects are the knowled ge of the
consequences of each link between given definitions,
conclusions and auxiliary assumptions.
What are the criteria for a good foundation of a math-
ematical theory?
1) ASSUMPTIONSMUSTBEREAUSTIC Assumptions are made
to simpl ify situation s, but they must have a large
scope . They should be bro ad enough to be applied to
more complicated situations.
2) DEFINITIONSMUST BESIMPLE, CLEARAND PRECISE.
3) ASSUMPTIONSANDDEFINITIONSMUSTBECONSISTENT: The
theoretician must use them consistently in each link
of the axiomatic structure, and newly built defini tions
must not con tradict the older ones .
4) DEFINITIONSAND EACHSTEP OFTHEAXIOMATICARGUMENT
JvfUSTBEFRUITFUL; They must enable the construction of
new definitions and new steps from them.
If these Kuhnian inspired conditions are satisfied, the
mathematical objects which are the basic ingre dients
of mathematical knowle dge will be based on a strong
foundation. Theorems, propositions and so on which
will arise from this foundation will be coherent since
their bu ild up will consist of consistent links between
the knowledge of consequences of each step we take.
As Putnam argues, generally, in empirical sciences,
for each theory, there exists other alternative theories,
or those which are stru ggling to be born. He notes:
As long as the major parts of classical
logic and number theory and analysis
have no alternatives in the field-al-
ternatives which require a change in
the axioms and which effect the sim-
plicity of total science, including em-
pirical science, so that a choice has to
be made-the situation will be what it
has always been. 5
This argument suggests tha t once a theory which is
more powerful than the already existing one appears,
it is justified to accep t the new theory. Putnam believes
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that the mathematicians can be wrong, not in the sense
that their proofs are misleading, bu t that the au xil-
iary assumptions they use might be wrong . He be-
lieves that this flexible character of ma thematics which
allows alternatives into the field makes mathematics
'empirical' .
His understanding of mathematics resembles the
Kuhnian notion of paradigms. As Kuhn suggests,
many different pa rad igms can exist in science. He ar-
gues that if an already existing paradigm has anoma-
lies, and contradictions, a new pa radigm is formed .
According to Kuhn , as long as both of the paradigms
are able to generate and solve puzzles, they are equally
adequate. It does not have to be that the supporters
of the different paradigms are in disagreement. Kuhn's
paradigms are incommensurable. Similarly, Pu tnam
allows the existence of d ifferent paradigms in math-
ematics. An example to this notion in mathematics is
the non-riva l existence of both Euclidean and non-
Euclidean geometry.
What happens if a newly formed theory is in con tra -
diction with the already existing one? According to
Popper, we wo uld then have to test the two theories
and falsify the less-satisfactory one. However, this
contradicts the notion of mathema tical truth that once
a mathematica l problem is solved, it is solved forever."
If a mathematical theory is formed on the bas is of the
criteria I have suggested, it is impossible that a proof
would be wrong since each knowledge we acquire at
each step of our theory is a consequence of the con-
clusions we acquire in the preceding step. Therefore,
if it happens that a theory contradicts the other, we
might want to follow Duhem's suggestion and look
at the auxiliary assumptions we make. It might be that
our assumptions are false, or that the assumptions of
the two contradicting theories are incommensurable.
Having discussed the foundations of mathematical
knowledge, next we ask the question: "Once we have
all the ingredients, how can we cook our recipe to
obtain mathe matical knowledge?" As Putnam argues:
"It do es seem at firs t blush as if the sole method tha t
mathematicians do use or can use is the me thod of
mathematical proof, and as if that me thod consists
Simply in deriving conclusions from axioms which
have been fixed once and for all by ru les of derivation
which have been fixed once and for all." 7 Putnam
creates an interesting story about Martian ma thema t-
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ics where Martians, in testing theories, use 'quasi- real numbers were not introduced through a rigorous
empirica l' methods which consist of statements gen- mathematical justification . However, the use of real
eralized by induction. This method of acquiring math- numbers in mathematics now enables us to construct
ema tical knowledge creates a new concept which we more complicated theories.
can call: 'mathematical confirma tion'. Putnam argues
that our refusal to use this 'Ma rtian' method limits To conclude, mathematics is a very interesting branch
the range of our proofs to only analytical ones. If we with lots of questions concern ing its origin, study,
were to use quasi-empirical methods, we could also methodology and its direction . It is, though. a unique
enjoy the discovery of syn thetic truths in mathemat- branch because it is precise, objective and universal.
ics. Actually, when we look back at our history, we It does not directly conjecture on nature as do the natu-
encounter the use of quasi -empirical methods. As ral sciences, but it provides a lan guage and founda-
Putn am suggests, the Greeks lacked the mathemati- tion on which natural sciences can base their stud ies
cal experience and mathematical sophistication, and securely.The object of mat hematics is not a subjective
therefore , they used generaliza tions in their ma th- object, but one can feel its power through its precise-
ema tical conjectures. The sim plest example is tha t the ness, consistency and fru itfulness.
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